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Abstract 
STAMP postulates that accidents result from inadequate enforcement of system safety constraints in design, development and 
operations. It claims that Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) is needed to ensure understanding of the entire accident 
process and all systemic causal factors involved. STAMP does not specify an accident investigation process. CAST uses 
information about accidental occurrences in its analyses application, including information, disseminated through investigation 
reports. When CAST analysts consider an accidental occurrence report as a candidate for analysis, they should be aware of the 
variations among investigation reports and how they might affect their analysis. They are unlikely to recognize them unless they 
have conducted and reported actual investigations using more than one method. This paper examines the information CAST 
requires and its sources, what that various safety investigations now provide, the variances in that information, other sources of 
input data CAST needs, and describes issues found. Changing investigation reports and methods however is necessary, but 
insufficient. It requires a non-Tayloristic view on human error and mobilizes other data sources of a systemic nature such as design 
history, network typologies and business models. 
 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of STAMP EU 2015. 
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1. Introduction 
The Systems– Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) model of accident causation postulates that 
accidents result from inadequate enforcement of system safety constraints among interacting components in design, 
development and operations [1].  The stated goal of STAMP is to assist in understanding why accidents occur and to 
use that understanding to create new and better ways to prevent losses. STAMP is needed because “Most accident 
reports…clearly described the events…but the analysis of those events is usually incomplete.” STAMP goes beyond 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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physical failures and includes dysfunctionalities, logic errors, non-failures and organizational characteristics. STAMP 
is utilized for hazard analyses using Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and accident analyses using Causal 
Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) because it claims they produce better results than current hazard analysis and 
accident analysis practices [2]. This study focuses on CAST, an approach for analysing accidents to identify the 
questions that need to be answered to fully understand why the accident occurred. CAST does not specify an accident 
investigation process, but only a way to document and analyse the results of such a process. It only considers how to 
analyse the data once it has been collected and organized and intends to contribute to determining what questions 
should be asked during the investigation as basis for maximizing learning from the events. 
The published CAST description asserts that “the causality models used in accident or incident analysis 
determines what we look for, how we go about looking for ‘facts’ and what we see as relevant.” STAMP-based 
accident analysis of information presented in existing reports results in a very different view of the accident and its 
causes. Use of CAST can document an accident process by showing the system safety control structure, safety 
constraints that were violated at each level of the control structure and why. It can identify weakness in the existing 
safety control structure and changes that will potentially eliminate all the causal factors including systemic ones. 
For this study, the term accident includes accidental occurrences of all kinds, including crashes, collisions, 
releases, near misses, explosions, fires, spills, personal injuries, industrial mishaps, marine casualties, and production 
disruptions, among others. This study examines the CAST process and the data inputs CAST examples used [3, 4]. It 
then examines the information safety investigations and other sources provide and attributes of that information. Then 
it analyzes how information investigators report affects the CAST accident analysis process. Suggestions for coping 
with difficulties found are then offered by suggesting criteria for case selection, expanding data sources to system 
information sources such as design history, network typologies and business models. 
2. The CAST accident analysis process 
The CAST accident analysis process involves improving the understanding of dynamic accident processes 
that produced losses. CAST is needed because STAMP deems event-based investigation documentation inadequate. 
CAST documents the accident processes by showing the sociotechnical safety control structure and safety constraints 
that were violated at each level of this control structure and why they were violated.  
2.1. CAST analysis steps 
Leveson [5] prescribes a nine step CAST analysis process. These steps are not necessarily performed in 
sequence. The nine steps suggest CAST source data requirements for such analyses. Slightly condensed, the steps are: 
1. Identify the systems and hazards involved in the loss. 
2. Identify safety constraints and requirements associated with each hazard period. 
3. Document the safety control structure in place, including each element and its attributes. This 
documentation can occur during other steps. 
4. Determine the proximate events leading to the loss. 
5. Analyse the loss at the physical system-level. 
6. Determine how and why the successive higher levels of the control structure allowed or contributed to 
the inadequate control at the current level. 
7. Examine overall coordination and communication contributions to the loss. 
8. Determine [any degradation] of safety control structure overtime. 
9. Generate recommendations. 
 
Although the selection of the reported accident to be analysed is required before CAST can begin, this step is 
not mentioned in the above list. That selection decision and its criteria affect the reported investigation data available 
for the CAST analyst to carry out the listed steps.  
3.2 CAST data needs 
 
Leveson [2] illustrates the steps in the CAST analysis process with two examples: a hypothetical chemical 
plant accident (E1) and a Loss of a Satellite (E2). Neither example includes a reproduction or citation of the accident 
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investigation reports analysed with CAST. Both contain narrative descriptions of the occurrence, but both analyses 
appear to contain much more data than the narrative descriptions or proximate event chains. An attempt was made to 
determine the data sources in the two examples for each of the nine CAST process steps. However, that attempt was 
frustrated by the absence of the underlying investigation report, and deviances from the nine step process sequence in 
which the CAST analyses content was presented. Little of the safety control or constraints data used includes its 
source, making it impossible to define the source(s) of much of the input data used in the CAST analyses examples. 
A footnote to E2 states “Some details of the control structure may be incorrect because they were not detailed in the 
report, but the structure is close enough for the purposes of this chapter.” 
While the footnote mentions only the control structure data uncertainty, it does not provide information about 
the source and validity of other data not contained in the narrative descriptions or proximate event chain provided. A 
CAST tutorial [4] indicates that selectivity and criticality of the STAMP output is limited: it lists 131 ‘constraints’ (36 
of physical nature, 56 middle management and 39 upper management level), producing 21 recommendations (9 of 
physical nature, 8 middle and 4 upper management) that sometimes seem very generic and superficial. The tutorial 
does not provide indications of how these constraints were related to the recommendations nor the decision algorithms 
on the selection of these recommendations in particular.  
Leveson [1] defines an accident as “an unplanned and undesired event that results in a loss including loss of 
human life or human injury, property damage, environmental pollution,” resulting from inadequate control or 
enforcement of constraints on safety-related behaviour at each level of the system. The author provides a general 
classification of accident causes, based on systems and control theory. Nine pages describe those causes, offering a 
library for analysts to expand the causal insights with CAST analyses. As such, CAST does not substantiate how to 
make the transition from explanatory variables in the analysis to design and change variables in drafting 
recommendations. How to incorporate CAST results in the process of Engineering a Safer World through a systemic 
approach remains unanswered. CAST restricts itself to the control aspects of such an engineering design effort at the 
lower and medium systems levels.  
 
3.3 Observations about CAST data expectations 
 
Leveson [1] identifies three types of factors that need to be considered in accident causation: the proximate 
event chain, conditions that allowed the events to occur, and indirect factors critical to fully understanding why the 
accident occurred. These abstractions offer one potential set of criteria for our comparison of what data CAST needs 
and what is available from investigation reports. CAST step 3 calls for documentation of the safety control structure 
in place in the system (at the time of the accident.) This documentation task is more like a safety audit of the dynamic 
system, rather than an investigation task. A comprehensive investigation method will document the influence(s) which 
the behaviour of a safety control system element had on the course of the accident process as an investigation data 
input. 
3. What data do investigation reports provide? 
Accident investigation methods, practices and reports vary widely. A European Commission Joint Research 
Center [5] presented an analysis of the attributes of at least twenty (20) identifiably different accident and incident 
investigation methods. We identified eight additional investigation methods in the literature, each method differing 
from each other in one or more details. Furthermore, the lack of criteria for many investigation tasks and decisions 
required by different methods demand personal interpretations of investigation tasks during their execution, resulting 
in further potential variations among reports. CAST analysts should know about the differences in investigation 
methods to aid them in their case selection and investigation data utilization decisions. Unless they have conducted 
investigations themselves, they may not be aware of the difficulties they may have to surmount in their analyses. 
Observations during numerous investigations and analyses of reports revealed that each method and tool set actually 
produces reported results differing from other reports. The observed differences include the report scope, source data 
selected, how source data is documented as facts, how facts are integrated to reconstruct what happened, the 
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terminology used, embedded conclusions, form of the reported results, how investigation quality is evaluated, the 
transparency of decisions made during the investigation, and the ultimate utility of the work products. 
Leveson [1] does not specify any specific investigation method. Instead, CAST is expected to raise questions 
that should be asked during investigations. CAST’s nine steps are designed to accomplish that goal. The CAST 
examples did not identify which of the twenty-eight methods or combinations of methods were used for the 
investigations and reports analyzed. Leveson [1] often alludes to shortcomings of most event based investigation 
results but does not identify which of the 28 methods might not exhibit the shortcoming(s) discussed. When the 
variability of methods is taken into account, CAST analysts’ expectations of getting answers from investigations for 
its nine step process will be very difficult to satisfy without further investigation of a reported case. To be efficient, 
investigation time should not be spent pursuit of extraneous data or irrelevant analyses, like assignment of causes 
categories. Some of the safety controls may turn out to be irrelevant in a specific accident or near miss. A series of 12 
potential threats to the quality of CAST analyses were identified due to variability in data input, as discussed below. 
 
4.1 Differences among investigation methods 
 
When CAST analysts consider an accidental occurrence report as a candidate for analysis, they should be 
aware of the variations among investigation reports and how they might affect their analysis. They are unlikely to 
recognize them unless they have conducted and reported actual investigations using more than one method.  
 
4.2 Scope 
 
No uniform ‘start/stop rules’ for investigation methods exist today. That means the scope of every 
investigation is dependent on the investigator’s judgment about what is deemed important, and thus likely to be 
inconsistent with CAST analysts’ judgments and data needs. The scope is readily identifiable from the report content, 
making this aspect of the case selection relatively simple. 
 
4.3 Data selection 
 
Investigation input data selection differences result from choices of data to support an investigator’s 
perception of what happened and what the investigator believes is supposed to be reported in the context of his/her 
mission. That affects the data an investigator will use, ranging from data generated by the occurrence to pre-existing 
data directly influencing the progression of the occurrence process, investigators’ personal experiential data, data to 
support investigators’ hypotheses, data thought to be exculpatory provided by affected parties, investigators’ 
assumptions, systems design data, operating or output data, and items on check lists. 
 
4.4 Input data documentation 
 
The nature and form of the ‘facts’ used by each method determine how an investigator will document 
investigation input data. Few methods specify the content, structure, grammar or syntax of documented “facts” and 
no documentation standards exist among the methods. The conflation of descriptive, explanatory and change variables 
among actual events creates confusion on direct cause-remedy relations and the validity and scope of 
recommendations.  
 
4.5 Input data integration 
 
The integration of investigation input data to create an explanatory description of what happened varies 
widely among investigation methods. That task requires the sequencing of all acquired investigation inputs according 
to their relative and absolute temporal and spatial relationships, the valid coupling of investigation inputs which 
influenced subsequent inputs with the influenced outputs to show relationships, and the filling of gaps in the evolving 
explanatory description.   The results depend on the kind and attributes of the investigation’s scenario reconstruction 
“building blocks,” and the integration process employed. Integrating building blocks created only from source data 
generated by the occurrence will produce different results then integrating that data pus experiential data, conjectures, 
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embedded conclusions or allegations from comparative or ‘hindsight analysis’. Including timing or linkages in the 
integration description produces yet other results.  
 
4.6 Integrated data use 
 
Some methods use an iterative integration process, entering each new relevant input to the existing integrated 
data, thus letting the existing data drive the investigation. Others collect the inputs based on prescribed functions, 
investigators’ hypotheses or intuitions, and then analyse everything, undertaking additional data acquisition if needed.  
The latter process will usually capture and report much irrelevant data which CAST analysis have to purge for their 
analysis.  
 
4.7 Cause attribution 
 
A significant input data integration problem is the attribution of cause to some aspects of integrated data, 
recognized as a problem by STAMP. Criteria for what safety investigators should call causes in a report, if provided 
at all, vary among methods and tools; some avoid the term. CAST analysts’ attention to primary cause relationships 
to judicial connotations in investigation reports should be perceived in view of the historical relation of the notion of 
“cause” with the judicial connotation of proof, truth, reasonable doubt and liability. 
 
4.8 Data integration rigor 
 
The rigor with which this data integration task is executed is yet another source of differences among 
investigation reports. The CAST analyst must be able to recognize these differences when selecting data from a report 
for a CAST analysis. It is unclear how CAST is supposed to deal with this specific challenge. In particular, where 
validity of volatile data sources is critical, timely preservation and retrieval is indispensable to include such data in a 
final integration.  
 
4.9 Terminology used 
 
The terminology used in investigation reports also varies widely. One difference among methods is in the 
level of abstraction of words that are used or tolerated in the descriptions and explanations of what happened. Some 
methods encourage assignment of abstract classifications according to a prescribed abstract taxonomy with glossaries 
or checklist while others call for greater specificity of words used in descriptions and explanations. Other differences 
include acceptance of passive voice, plural nouns, pronouns, conjunctions, and similar devices that mask investigators’ 
lack of true understanding of what happened. Pejorative words in reports create further problems. CAST analysts must 
also be able to deal with these terms and their significance when selecting data from an investigation report. 
 
4.10 Form of reports 
 
Another difference among methods is the form of the reported investigation results. Some methods use forms, 
others use narrative reports, graphical displays, or narrative reports supplemented with illustrations of various kinds.  
Forms force investigators to recast their data to enter it into blank spaces on forms, and conform to a glossary or 
instructions. This usually undermines the specificity required for detailed understanding and replication of the 
investigation results. Narrative reports suffer from the linearity of natural language, requiring CAST analysts to 
integrate the data they can glean from the report, and complicating their use. 
 
4.11 Quality assurance 
 
The quality of investigation reports differs widely among methods. Almost all methods lack objective quality 
assurance procedures and criteria that will result in consistent quality assurance tests and results. Instead quality is 
assured by subjective team consensus, editorial or peer reviews, simulator experiments or personal judgments, for 
example.  Without an objective quality assurance process, personal biases cannot be eliminated, and the validity and 
completeness of the reported occurrence description cannot be assumed. Few investigation methods require 
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identification of the sources for every data element used in the description and explanation of what happened. This 
means CAST analysts face the difficult challenge of ensuring the validity of any investigation report data they elect 
to use. 
 
4.12 Decision Transparency 
 
Investigators must make many decisions during any investigation about resource allocations, data to pursue, 
inferences drawn from observations, building block documentation, integration of acquired data, terms to use, 
completeness of the investigation, handling of uncertainties, evidence handling, and spurious data inputs. Decision 
guidance is provided by some methods, but few methods offer or require decision transparency in their processes. 
Validating the decisions made in investigation reports thus reverts to the CAST analysts. 
4. Discussion 
The adequacy of accident reports as input for CAST analyses faces several challenges All those challenges, as 
referred below, put requirements on a forensic investigator’s perspectives, competences and skills. 
x Any socio-technical engineered system –and in particular transport systems-  has an engineering design history 
of decades in which assumptions, decisions and trade-offs have been made that restrict flexibility and adaptation 
and define the margins for future operations. Such systems renovate rather than innovate. 
x In transport systems, accident investigations have had a specific function to prevent similar occurrences. The 
focus of such investigations has been on the accident phenomenon as such, and in particular on the reliability of 
the technology in combination with the role of the operator. Notions such as Good seamanship and Good 
Airmanship are a representation of such delegated and distributed responsibilities of sharp end operatorship. 
Molding this investigation legacy into a STAMP systemic perspective requires a new view on human error. 
x The absence of information about the sources of the data used in the examples impeded both the attempt to identify 
and analyze the investigation report data actually used for CAST case selection and analyses, so that attempt had 
to be abandoned. Some investigation methods require identification of the sources for every data element used in 
the description and explanation of what happened. What data sourcing approach for CAST analysts’ input data 
needs might be pursued?  
x In the context of accident investigation protocols and investigation mandates, higher systems levels that contain 
control mechanisms of a higher order are not subjected to investigations compliant with ICAO Annex 13. They 
however contain systemic principles, properties, configurations and institutional arrangements that govern safety 
control strategies and mechanisms, due to which its inherent safety performance is dictated by the actual network 
configuration and business models. Applying a STAMP perspective to safety investigations should also take into 
account such higher levels of control and inherent properties. 
 
5.1 Engineering design history and modeling data 
 
Leveson [1] argues that event chain models often do not provide the information necessary to prevent future 
losses. Two of the many accident models driving investigations - the Heinrich domino model and Reason Swiss cheese 
model - are cited and analysed as the examples of event chain models. Leveson [1] argues that spending time 
determining the relative contributions of events or conditions to accidents such as arguing about whether an event is 
the root cause or a contributory clause or cause factor is not productive outside the legal system. So, the author argues 
for an all-causes model based on system safety controls. She identifies three types of factors that need to be considered 
in accident causation: the proximate event chain, conditions that allowed the events to occur, and indirect factors 
critical to fully understanding why the accident occurred. The STAMP model mirrors the traditional cause-centred 
investigation model rather than input-output based system models widely used in modern operations research, systems 
engineering and software development, which provide greater specificity. 
With respect to the STAMP model as an engineering design effort, each of the socio-technical systems and 
networks have an evolving ‘history’ with multiple adaptations, based on principles, assumptions, models and theories. 
During design, development and operations, many trade-offs are made, while certification and standardization, 
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operational procedures and licensing are moulded into a shared body of knowledge and experience. Such a body 
consists of both tacit knowledge and scientific notions, allocating functions and tasks to each of the partners in the 
network, enabling them to operate the system safely under a variety of conditions and constraints [6].  
 
5.2 Human error: a Tayloristic notion 
 
In the 19th century Frederick Winslow Taylor developed the science of analysing work, and so introduced 
Taylor’s principles of scientific management. These principles applied well for the manual labour industry at that 
time, and showed that an increase in production could be realized by a standardisation of workers, tasks and working 
methods. Several decades later, during and shortly after World War II, the rapid development of technology, combined 
with the fast throughput of operators, especially military, presented a problem: operators were not mentally prepared 
to master the complexity and dynamics of new systems. This increased interaction between man and machine showed 
that next to physical capabilities, operators also required specific mental/cognitive capacities to work effectively. As 
a result, this called for much research into experimental psychology, which later developed into the field of human 
factors. These developments shifted an operator’s profile from Taylor’s sharp separation of workers from rationally 
understanding their tasks, to a profile where operators were required to be cognitively engaged in their operations. 
The more they understood their machine, the more adept operators they could be, increasing production/effectiveness. 
However, the most recent development of computerized automation since the 1980’s has been continually 
increasing the complexity of machines that must be operated. As operators of such machines reach the limit of their 
cognitive capacity, again there seems to be a shift towards the Tayloristic concept of the operator - or worker not fully 
comprehending the nature of their tasks, but executing it as trained. Such operational standardisation will provide 
room for further development of automation, but it seems that even this neo-Taylorism can reach its limits. This limit 
has been observed in civil aviation, where neo-Taylorism has manifested itself as a strong culture of compliance based 
training and operations. Such an approach has been effective in reaching an incredibly high industry safety 
performance; nevertheless, the accident rate has not decreased much in recent years. 
Several theories and research studies explain that the expansion of automation has decreased the role of the 
pilot to the extent that the pilot becomes too dissociated from the operations, and fail to adequately respond to 
unfamiliar and/or unexpected situations. This manifests itself in effects such as automation complacency, automation 
bias, lack of system knowledge and lack of manual skills. Concurrently, a change in the economic climate in the 
aviation sector is pushing airlines to unseen levels of cost efficient operations. Such financial drivers enforce cost 
reduction in selection, training and operations. As a result, minimalized compliance based training and operations 
have nearly become industry standard.  
The notion of human error and subsequent risk control management mechanisms at the operational level have 
been criticized by scientific and organisational experts, leading to a series modifications of the original notion of man-
machine interface. However, they still provide a strong support for the introduction and deployment of a Tayloristic 
approach in transport and consequently, a continuation of the notion of ‘human error’ as the leading cause for 
accidents. Whether a Tayloristic approach is beneficial and feasible is not a normative judgement but highly depends 
on such systemic properties, which are leading in the assessment of whether Taylorism is applicable or not in aviation 
as one of the most complex and dynamic socio-technical systems of our times [7]. 
 
5.3 Expanding and adapting data sources 
 
Any attempt to identify CAST case selection and source data availability improvement has limited options 
in reality: expand CAST data sources or change investigation reports. Changing CAST data sources could be 
implemented by referring to safety audits or system safety analyses where they exist, or other investigation reports 
involving the same system which might contain system safety control information. Another option might be to build 
an expanded STAMP system control library for CAST analysts to adapt to their specific case. Documented 
descriptions of system design or operations might offer another source, although our experience indicates such 
documentation is often incomplete for CAST use. Any sources used should not undermine the purpose, goals and 
results of the CAST process. Replacing investigations of events by unambiguous, pre-emptive modelling of events is 
not feasible, if even desirable [6]. 
Changing investigation reports would be very challenging. With the diversity of methods used and the 
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amount of effort required to identify and document the control system, bringing about this change in all methods 
would likely be a daunting effort [8].  However, if one or more investigation methods almost meet the STAMP model 
data requirement, perhaps the extra data needed for CAST analyses could be adapted in those methods. Leveson [1] 
mentions event-based and Root Cause models and by inference the related investigation methods as not satisfying. 
The author does not provide any comparable analysis of the specific shortcomings of the many other methods used, 
so any “nearly usable” methods are not readily identifiable. A competent and sufficiently funded investigation could 
document the influence(s) which a safety control system element had on the progression of the accident process as an 
investigation input for integration with other inputs to explain the whys of the occurrence [1]. 
Leveson [1] argues that the STAMP accident model could encourage inclusion of all ‘causal factors’ in 
investigations and provide guidance for identifying those factors during CAST analyses. Analysing all the 
investigation methods to find ‘best fit’ for CAST is beyond the control system scope of this study because there are 
so many methods to analyse. Leveson [2] example cases seem to be based on relatively complex, expensive and 
comprehensive investigations by a judicial commission, military unit, presidential commission, especially formed 
investigation entities, national investigation agencies, or similar entities. The level of detail of the data they contain 
facilitated the application of CAST analyses in the examples. It is unclear if and where a borderline exists between 
investigations that produce enough data to support a CAST analysis and those that do not. Beyond these practical 
arguments, more methodological issues should be considered explicitly in establishing criteria for selecting case 
examples. Mostly implicit in their application, substantive issues are concerned with: a judicial use of the notion of 
cause, the burden of proof in establishing causal factors with sufficient certainty, application of verification and 
falsification principles in providing evidence, application of stop rules for scoping, framing and resource allocation, 
and the purpose of apportioning blame and liability versus learning or systemic change. 
 
5.4 Network typologies 
 
Taking into account the systems theoretical basis of STAMP, additional data derived from the system itself 
must be considered. Taking into account the limitations of investigation reports, building a library of STAMP safety 
control structures and safety control performance data also requires insights in the characteristics of the socio-technical 
networks under scrutiny. Modelling such networks with respect to their technological development and social 
dynamics becomes a challenge by itself.  
From a technological control perspective, a variety of network structures must be taken into account, each 
with their underlying properties, technological characteristics, performance indicators and change capabilities. Such 
a variety inevitably requires a more sophisticated systems modelling. Rosenkopf and Schilling [9] discriminate three 
types networks, depending on their network and component size, source of variation, connectivity across entities, 
systems integration and architectural control. Control over technological development in such networks is determined 
by research & development costs, knowledge hubs, degree of coupling, platform leadership and hierarchical control 
over the final system. The typology of such alliance networks – disconnected, hybrid and spider web- determines the 
empowerment of each entity in the network to adapt, change and participate in information alliances.  They determine 
the constraints on change and adaptation at higher system levels and identify the abilities to optimize, adapt or 
innovate.  
With respect to the social control dynamics of such networks, empowerment over these safety control 
mechanisms is not equally distributed over the participants in the network. Each of the participants has specific roles 
and serves as control agents for specific aspects, based on their ability to engineer, educate or enforce. Each of them 
has a specific scope, means and resources, with coping capacity, trade-offs and impact on specific systems level 
varying from an individual, organizational or governance nature.  
 
5.5 Business models 
 
An understanding of the ‘entire accident process’ and ‘all systemic factors’ that enable control over systems 
safety performance has to cover all systems levels of control. Such understanding cannot be restricted to input from 
accident reports on operational processes and managerial control models. Business models within enterprises and 
governance over institutional arrangements are seldom subjected to scrutiny during accident investigations. However, 
they have an inherent impact on the constraints imposed on medium as well as lower systems levels. 
In his work ‘Stabilizing an Unstable Economy’, Minsky [10] addresses the stabilizing and control over 
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unstable financial systems. In analogy with financial-economical systems, transport systems also can be defined as 
unstable systems due to their inherent properties. They contain an open architecture, are interoperable and 
interconnected, continuously operating on a 24/7 basis, provide free access at any node and hub in a global network 
configuration to autonomous operators, are controlled in a heterarchical manner with delegated and distributed 
responsibilities, should be able to absorb continuous changes and have to deal with crises and perturbations during 
operations at any time, state and place. 
The inherent instability of these systems is met by institutional arrangements, which over time create the 
illusion of stability by damping oscillations of inherent properties. At the same time, profit and efficiency oriented 
innovations make the system susceptible and vulnerable for perturbations and distortions. Institutional arrangements 
are partly undermined, while governance is tested for its ability to maintain control. Such a seeming stability stimulates 
instability. Such innovations add instability and reinforce oscillation of control mechanisms to the trade-offs that are 
already made at the operational level and the functional resonance that occurs at the managerial level due to value 
assessment of the system functionalities. 
The taxonomy of Minsky [10] enables identification of three phases of prospect systemic failure: 
x Prospective expectations of improved performance may lead to optimization on a short term by collecting 
monetary profits from such performance. At the operator control level, the efficiency-thoroughness trade-off 
principle is considered a valid principle for profit optimization. This operational erosion by local optimization 
due to operating in the margins of the performance envelope, over emphasizes over short term cost efficiency 
considerations 
x Speculative expectations trigger extrapolation of an existing, seemingly stable situation by validating such 
expectations as apparent future performance of the system. At the managerial level, added values of functionalities 
are reconsidered and prioritized accordingly, potentially creating functional resonance. This incremental erosion 
due to pushing the limits of operations favours specific performance aspects to the detriment of other performance 
parameters 
x A final situation in which profit-taking is no longer covered by future developments due to a lagging investment 
in precautionary and stabilizing arrangements. Privatizing, outsourcing, deregulating, introduction of business 
principles such as faster-cheaper-better legitimize structural reductions on institutional investments in safety 
management and research funding and give control to market forces in introducing new developments. This 
conceptual erosion in wilful violating performance margins or relief of institutional safety barriers by favours 
free market forces. 
In such a process of increasing instability, incremental changes mask the instable character of developments, 
eroding institutional arrangements at each systems level of operator, enterprise and governance. Interventions become 
uncontrollable with an inevitable snowball effect on the eventual drift into collapse of the system. Professional 
minorities which resist change based on their insights and proficiency with the systems performance dynamics, are 
ignored. Such professionals are allocated a role as whistle blowers and excluded from the system. Without 
institutionalized feedback loops at a higher systems level –such as independent safety agencies- these systems become 
introspective and reactive. Any feedback based attempt to control and intervene in such systems without understanding 
the roles and dynamics of disciplinary knowledge, technological innovation, product development and service 
building in innovation, is deemed to fail due to the masking of its inherent properties [11]. Such failure mechanisms 
operate at the highest system levels, subject to social and political forces. Intervention at this system level is 
interrelated with power relations as described by Foucault [12]. They take the form of oscillation of system values and 
erosion of institutional dimensions. 
 
5.6 Analysts’ proficiency 
 
Specific roles, resources, decision processes and their underlying engineering design processes require a 
thorough understanding by the CAST analyst of system dynamics and control mechanisms, how a system was 
designed, how it operates in practice, and how and why it evolved through its life cycle into its current operational 
states and practices. Dynamic adaptation may result in either a drift into failure or recovery from disturbances and 
perturbations. Expanding the analysis to such an encompassing oversight over the systems’ functioning requires 
multiple modelling of system aspects which goes far beyond the scope of safety investigation processes [13]. Such 
analysis requires: a professional understanding, experience and tacit knowledge of operational practices; the 
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introduction of stop rules in the search strategy for data to prevent an ever expanding modelling of the system, an 
abstraction from reality and a never-ending need for more data; evidence as a legitimate basis for effective 
intervention.  
The examples in Leveson [2] suggest that CAST system boundary selection, safety control structure 
descriptions and safety control performance data can be based on analysts’ previous knowledge of the involved 
systems and controls, the analyst’s library of STAMP control models, inferences from the proximate events chain, 
analysts’ informed conjectures or possibly dogma, rather than extracted explicitly from investigation reports.   
5. Conclusions 
Investigation reports are necessary but insufficient for CAST analyses. Analysts should not expect all 
accidental occurrence investigation reports to satisfy CAST safety control and constraint design and performance 
input data requirements. Investigation reports are the products of investigation methods with a specific goal, conducted 
within the mission, legal limitations and perceived needs of their investigative entities. Analysts should recognize the 
distinction between investigating episodic occurrences and analysing the systems’ safety performance at a dynamic 
network level. The description and explanation of what happened differs from an evaluation of the control 
mechanisms, constraints and change agents that enhance safety in the system itself. At best, analysts might try to 
identify reports created with investigation methods that can most nearly satisfy their data needs. 
Analysts need to look elsewhere for source data to support the re-engineering of systems: safety audits for 
safety control data, modelling and simulation of system dynamic behaviour, drivers of technological innovation and 
information sharing in network configurations, or a library of control systems and constraints they develop during 
their analyses. An alternative would be to try to bring about changed investigation methods to provide desired data 
for systemic change and knowledge development. This would require changing expectations of investigation reports 
as learning tools and incremental change agents. It would also require harmonization of existing methods, with the 
development of a different structure and method for investigations by creating a framework and template for 
composing systems models and identify ‘building bocks’ for composing multilinear sequences of events that occurred 
[8]. 
With the known reported data variability among methods, CAST analysts should be wary about using 
subjective or abstract investigation or control source data in the analyses, to minimize uncertainty levels in their work 
and contention over their outputs. CAST analysts would also be well advised to use causal data in investigation reports 
sparingly if at all because of the nature of cause attributions during investigations and their relationship to judicial 
connotations of proof, truth, reasonable doubt and liability. 
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